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Building Bridges: Bringing International
Human Rights Home
Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyolt
This commentary on "Building Bridges" was prepared in connection
with a panel presentation addressing the same theme by Latina/o law
professors during the 1995 Hispanic National Bar Association's annual
meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It urges that we globalize our domestic
legal practice by integrating international human rights norms as a means
of developing, expanding and transforming the content and meaning of
our human/civil rights jurisprudence. This piece contends that we have a
wealth of human rights laws to which we have denied ourselves access in
the past and of which we should make greater and better use in the future.
To be sure, the current political-social climate favors isolationism and
Congress has loudly articulated its misdirected "stay within the lines" (i.e.,
borders) policy which is not likely to comport with the perspective of this
piece. Nonetheless, the benefits to be reaped from the incorporation of
accepted human rights principles into our domestic rights discourse merits
careful attention.
The aim of this bridge-building proposal is to provide a blueprint for
co-existence in this diverse world of ours, comprised of myriad boiling,
not melting pots. Although a diversity perspective certainly informs that
there are many bridges to build, this essay concentrates on joining
philosophical and international forces to build one grand structure-a
bridge that can transport all individuals regardless of sex, race, national or
social origin, class, religion, sexuality, color or political beliefs
comfortably into the twenty-first century.
The first portion of the bridge that requires attention is our
comunidad latina. Before this community can participate in building
coalitions with other so-called "outsider" communities and groups, we
must build bridges within our own peoples. This internal coalescing
compels first and foremost a recognition of the diversity of our own
Latina/o community.
In legal academic circles, many of us were friends as we commenced
our professional journey and we could be counted on as two sets of
hands. Imagine, when I started teaching in 1982 there were merely
twenty-two Latinas/os in full-time, tenure-track positions in only fifteen of
the approximately one hundred and seventy U.S. law schools-only two
of us were Latinas.
Our numbers have grown, we total over one hundred now, but there
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Many thanks to Alison N. Stewart (St.
John's Law '96) for her research assistance.
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are still more law schools than we would like to admit without a single
Latina/o on their faculties, including many schools in urban centers with
large and diverse Latina/o communities. Our small numbers have allowed
us to get to know each other and create an academic legal community
generous with its time and support. We find each other with ease and
excitement when we meet in San Francisco, San Antonio, New York,
Washington, Miami, Provo, Albuquerque, Chicago, Vienna, Cairo,
Copenhagen, Ciudad Mdjico, Beijing, Rio and San Juan. Our origins can
be traced to all of those sites and many more which is why we must
celebrate the complexity and diversity of our Latina/o roots.
My personal experience is not unlike that of many Latinas/os. I was
born in Cuba and grew up in Puerto Rico. Unbeknownst to me until quite
recently, the environment in which I lived my formative years has made a
dramatic difference in my life and how I see the world. If you
contemplate a global m6lange you might have a glimpse of the diversity
with which I lived every day of my life until I went to college in the states.
We were big and small, brown-eyed and blue-eyed, blondes and brunettes,
but one significant factor we shared was that we were all de Borinquen.
Sure, we were a diverse peoples, but we were all united-we were all
boricua. Little did I know that being boricua makes you somehow
"diferente"-an outsider-in the U.S. Being "diferente," however does not,
and should not mean we cannot be unified; indeed we all were as boricua.
The second piece of the bridge I would like to suggest we build is one
that will at least start to address the alleged "great racial divide," meaning
black-white, that exists in this country. In order to have the solid bridge I
envision, the divide needs to be exposed and healed. For one, the racial
divide must be recognized as having a lot more that two color
components. Essayist Richard Rodriguez's October 3, 1995 commentary
during the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour eloquently unmasked the fallacy of
underinclusiveness endemic to contemporary race discourse. His
observations concerned the O.J. Simpson trial on the heels of the
announcement of the jury's verdict. Mr. Rodriguez pondered, as he
followed the trial and the opinion polls that inevitably accompanied it,
why he never saw himself or his opinions reflected or acknowledged.
Where, he asked, were the opinions of Latinas/os and Asians in all those
telling polls which, according to their own terms, were based on race and
gender? That simple question underscores the Shakespearean flaw
heralded as infallible truth in our society, including the law: everything
appears to be based upon a black/white dichotomy, or what the media
portrays as a black/white divide, which, by its nature excludes entire
segments of this country's population.
There is a lot more to being American than being black or white or
brown. Recognition of the multidimensionality of all peoples should be
acknowledged as a way to describe, though not define, the citizens and
residents of the United States. Certainly for Latinas/os and Asians to be
excluded from (and therefore rendered invisible by) polling in Los
Angeles defies credibility. On the other hand, if these groups were in fact
included in the polling, collapsing them into the black/white dichotomy, it
would deny their separate identities and silence their possibly different
voices thus revealing the imperfection of a binary classification scheme.
[Vol. 9:69
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Such a black/white dichotomy might have been (and may still be) an
appropriate focus in our justice system when addressing the institution of
slavery and its hideous, long-lasting legacy-although even in this respect
there are historical issues concerning Chinese exclusion, Japanese
internment, American Indian massacre and Mexican peonage. In all
events, modern reality presents a dramatically different and much more
complex demography. Significantly (and sadly) history is replete with
examples of how differences are used to divide rather than to learn and
conquer challenges. Thus, we must build bridges that allow all people to
adjust to the realities of the present world and facilitate our
communications across whatever racial barriers exist-not only to bring
the barriers down but also to seek solutions to our all-too-common
problems such as housing, crime, education and welfare, to name a few.
Moreover, any view of the world as a simple race/ethnicity dichotomy
is tragically flawed at other levels as there is much more than race that
defines each and every one of us as precious, unique individuals. For
example, we are male and female; we are gay and lesbian and non-gay
and non-lesbian; we enjoy different levels of education; we span a broad
range of social and economic classifications and of mental and physical
abilities; we speak many tongues; and we are Catholic, Protestant,
Santera/o, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and Jew. Thus in looking at the world
and in building bridges to traverse it, we have to look at the people, not
some singular characteristic that can be isolated and manipulated to effect
a myth of insurmountable racial or ethnic or sex-based or sexuality-based
or religious-based divisions.
This multidimensional perspective leads to the last part of the bridge:
the segment connecting our domestic practice to International Law. This
essay develops this proposal1 by establishing that International Human
Rights Law is U.S. law and describing some of the rights protected by
International Human Rights Law that when incorporated into our
jurisprudence can develop, expand and transform our domestic concept
of civil rights. This piece then focuses on three particular issues that are
of critical importance to us as diverse peoples of color-Penalties (as in
death), Privacy (as in personal), and Indecent Propositions (as in 187)2 to
provide concrete examples of how international norms can protect
fundamental human rights.
THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
There can be no question that international human rights norms are
legally enforceable rights, not merely aspirational statements of moral
goals. To be sure, one of the problems in accepting this conclusion is that
the acknowledgement of the existence of legally enforceable human
rights results in the concession that there exist limitations on the power of
I. Some of the ideas presented here will appear in greater detail in Berta Esperanza Hernindez-
Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision: An International Human Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUM'
THE NEW NATIVIsM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES, (Juan Perea ed.,
forthcoming 1996).
2. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West).
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governments, i.e., the obligation of States to respect inalienable human
rights is a limitation on States' sovereignty--supposedly a "supreme,
absolute power [of an] independent State to govern."3 Thus, recognition
of legally enforceable international human rights makes States
accountable to individuals and to other States for any violation of
recognized rights, even those of a State's own citizens. This, of course, is
the lesson learned by the international community of nations from the
Trials at Nuremberg, a tragedy in world history that effectively placed the
protections of individuals and their rights as human beings at the heart of
international law.
That international norms are legally binding is consonant with U.S.
domestic law which itself recognizes the existence of international law.
For example, Article I, §8, clause 10 of the Constitution, gives Congress
the power to "define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of
Nations." Moreover, Article VI clause 6, defines the relationship between
international law and domestic law by designating treaties as "the supreme
law of the land." In addition, case law recognizes that customary
international law-law that emerges from practices of States that is
deemed to be obligatory-is U.S. law.4  Thus, adopted treaties or
recognized customary principles are binding domestic law.
The concept of reservations- unilateral statements by States that can
limit their international obligations-is particularly relevant when
contained in human rights treaties. Although the notion of reservations is
accepted in international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties prohibits reservations that are "incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty. "5 Moreover, reservations designed to excuse parties
from commitments made with respect to non-derogable rights will fail and
the reserving state will be bound to such obligations. In all events, a
reservation designed to enable a state to suspend a non-derogable
fundamental right will most likely be deemed incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty. Consequently, prohibitions against racial
discrimination and genocide, and perhaps even sex discrimination, will be
invalid.
Binding international human rights norms provide significant
protections beyond our "domestic" civil rights laws. For example, Article
2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 6 (hereinafter,
"ICCPR") and Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights7
(hereinafter, "Universal Declaration") protect individuals from
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status. Other protected rights pertinent to the issues in this essay are
the rights to privacy, education, health, life, impart and receive
3. BLACKS LAW DiCfIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 19 (1969).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1949, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. I
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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information and association, to name a few.
While the international legal system affords many opportunities to
expand the reach of domestic protections of individual rights, it is not
perfect. One weakness of the system is the immense gap between women's
legal status as equal to men and their real world/life status as not.8
Significantly both the U.N. and the U.S. Dept. of State, neither a bastion
of gender equality, have recognized that women's true position around the
world is one of Inequality. Consequently, although this essay advocates
bringing human rights home, it also exhorts transforming the system that
gives life to those rights so that some are not more equal than others.
With these considerations in mind, this essay scrutinizes the possible
impact of an international human rights analysis on three specific matters
of concern to communities of color.
THE DEATH PENALTY, PERSONAL PRIVACY AND PROPOSITION 187
The U.S. is the only industrial state that still imposes the death penalty
and, it appears, not without causing legal professionals, including Supreme
Court Justices, much alarm. A jarring example of such trepidation
surfaced recently when Supreme Court Justice Blackmun, a Nixon
appointee who is not to be mistaken for a liberal in criminal cases, stepped
down with the public pronouncement that, after years of voting to sustain
capital sentences, he had concluded that the death penalty is
unconstitutional. Just prior to stepping down, Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent in Callins v. Collins,9 recognized the disparate application of the
death penalty:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared
that the death penalty must be imposed fairly, and with
reasonable consistency, or not at all, and, despite the
effort of the states and courts to devise legal formulas
and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge,
the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake.10
Justice Blackmun's words are chilling in light of the facts:
• Between 1973 and 1992, a total of 4,704 convicted murderers were
sentenced to death, but only 188 of them, or 4 percent, were executed;
* 1,815 of those death row prisoners, or 39 percent, succeeded in having
their death sentences lifted by judicial review or executive clemency;
8. For a full discussion of the schism between the rules concerning sex equality and the reality of
sex inequality worldwide, see Berta Esperanza Hern~ndez-Truyol, Women's Rights Are Human
Rights-Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 605
(1996).
9. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1130.
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* 451 of those sentenced to die-nearly 10 percent-had their
underlying convictions overturned on appeal."
One U.S. death penalty case, Stanford v. Kentucky,' 2 is particularly
pertinent to this essay as it declares the constitutionality of the imposition
of the death penalty on a minor. In this light, the U.S. finds itself in
notable (if not noteworthy) company. Aside from the embarrassing fact
that the U.S. leads the world in the execution of juveniles, there are only
six other countries worldwide known to have executed juveniles in the last
decade: Barbados (which has since raised the age to 18), Iran, Iraq,
Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
In contrast to U.S. law, Article 6.5 of the ICCPR prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles and on pregnant women.13
It is historically germane to note that when President Carter first submitted
the ICCPR to Congress for its constitutionally mandated advice and
consent, the executive transmittal of the treaty included a blanket
reservation against Article 6.5. Effectively, the reservation as submitted
by President Carter provided that the U.S. retained its sovereign right to
execute persons under 18 as well as pregnant women.
However, when President Bush resubmitted the ICCPR to Congress in
1991, the reservation against the prohibition of imposition of the death
penalty applied only to the execution of minors, not to the execution of
pregnant women. This U.S. acceptance of the ICCPR's prohibition against
the imposition of the death penalty on pregnant women raises an
intriguing question about the relationship of the international norm to
U.S. domestic law. Has the U.S., by ratifying this human rights treaty
constitutionally prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on a
certain class of persons, to wit, pregnant women (or as it is a constitutional
question one should say, per Justice Rhenquist, pregnant persons)?' 4 It
seems that the answer is a clear yes: the United States, by treaty, has agreed
to limit its sovereign right to impose the death penalty in certain cases.
This creates an interesting constitutional analytical construct because that
prohibition would not be based upon Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-
the basis for the U.S. death penalty jurisprudence. Rather, the prohibition
would be constitutionally mandated by the Supremacy Clause.
Although the withdrawal of the reservation with respect to pregnant
women was more likely than not the result of the Reagan/Bush
Administrations' "choice" politics, the rationale is of no moment. The
significance of the action lies in the prohibition of a domestic remedy by
virtue of the application of international treaty law, the supreme law of the
land. This consequence is concrete evidence of the possible domestic
impact of international human rights norms: the expansion, development
and transformation of U.S. rights jurisprudence.
11. David 0. Stewart, Dealing with Death, g0 NOV. A.B.A.J. 50, 50 (1994).
12. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
13. ICCPR. supra note 6, art. 6.5.
14. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,494-497 (1974).
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Such analysis raises an interesting question with respect to the U.S.
reservation against the prohibition on the execution of minors based upon
the Supreme Court's Stanford decision. Could an international tribunal
deem a reservation whereby a party seeks to retain the right to execute
minors to be against the object and purpose of the ICCPR and,
consequently, render it invalid-particularly in light of that treaty's Article
24 mandate that the State, among others, protect minors? In this respect
it is significant that in March of 1995 the U.S. made its first ever
appearance before the U.N. Human Rights Committee (hereinafter,
"UNHRC"), following its 1992 ratification of the ICCPR, marking the first
time in history that the U.S. government had to answer to an international
body about its civil and political rights. Not surprisingly, the U.S. was
grilled by 6 of the 18 committee members on this country's continuing
policy of allowing the imposition of the death penalty on children who
commit crimes when they are under the age of 18. The UNHRC asked
the U.S. to explain its juvenile death penalty reservations, especially as the
convention considers the ban on juvenile death sentences so important
that countries can not violate it even during national emergencies. Under
severe criticism, Conrad Harper, legal advisor for the U.S. State
Department said "[w]e recognize that very deep and very powerful
arguments have been heard about the juvenile death penalty ... This is
under review, and we do not exclude the possibility of a change."' 5
Similarly, various other questions arise. What if the U.S. had reserved
against the prohibition of imposing the death penalty on pregnant
women? Could such a reservation nonetheless have been construed as
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty and thus, in all
events, be deemed invalid? In addition, if the reservation regarding
minors is deemed to be invalid as against the object and purpose of the
treaty, are there any viable international or domestic fora available to
prevent the U.S. from carrying out such executions?
Likewise, in light of ICCPR's Article 2 and Article 26 prohibitions
against racial discrimination, if it is established that the United States'
imposition of the death penalty disproportionately affects a protected
racial group, does the imposition of such penalty place the U.S. in
violation of its international obligations not to discriminate on the basis of
race?' 6 It is important in this context to note that introducing the U.S.'s
initial report to the UNHRC, John. Shattuck, Assistant U.S. Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor acknowledged "that the
United States['] history of racism, slavery and racial segregation had
among other factors posed obstacles to the full and optimal enjoyment by
all Americans of the rights reflected in the Covenant.. . ."17 Significantly,
15. Human Rights-U.S. : Washington Pledges Improvements to U.N. Group, Inter Press Service,
March 31, 1995.
16. This question, of course, needs to be contextualized: as of October 1994 the total number of
death row inmates (known to LDF) was 2,948 with 1,446 (49.05%) being white, 1,180 (40.03%) being
black, 205 (6.95%) Latina/o, 49 (1.66%) Native American, 22 (.75%) Asian, 46 (1.56%) unknown.
2,907 were men; only 41 were women. Of the 253 executions one was a woman; the rest were men.
Of those executed, 140 (55.33%) were white; 97 (38.34%) black; 15 (5.93%) Latina/o; 1 (.39%) Native
American. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A. 1-3 (Fall 1994).
17. Human Rights Committee Begins Considering Initial Report of the United States, Human Rights
Committee, HR/CT/400, 53rd Sess., 1401st mtg. (1995).
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nearly 40% of those executed since 1976 have been black, although
blacks constitute only 12% of the population.ls
This same question needs to be underscored with regard to execution
of juveniles as existing data shows that 69% of all juveniles executed since
1600 whose race is known have been black; after 1900 75% of all
executed juveniles have been black.' 9 And, in spite of criticism on the
practice of executing juveniles, Human Rights Watch indicated to the
UNHRC that four of the nine juveniles executed in the U.S. since 1973
were killed in 1993.20
Privacy and Proposition 187 are two other excellent examples of ways
international human rights norms can expand, develop and transform U.S.
law. In addition to the non-discrimination protections, international law,
unlike our own constitution, expressly protects individuals' right to
privacy. Article 17 of the ICCPR states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation." 21
Not only does the U.S. constitution not expressly protect privacy rights,
although such rights have been found to exist in the "penumbra" of
articulated rights, the penumbra does not protect all U.S. citizens alike. In
Bowers v. Hardwick the United States Supreme Court concluded that
adult, consensual homosexual conduct in the privacy of an individual's
home was not to be afforded the same privacy protections that adult,
consensual heterosexual conduct was granted. 22 In sharp contrast, the
ICCPR's Article 17 privacy provision has been interpreted to include
protection of sexual conduct between consenting adults-homosexual and
heterosexual conduct alike. 23 Thus, contrary to the U.S. trend of
demonizing or alienating gays and lesbians as a class, and in contrast to
one court's holding that it is illegal even to legislate against discrimination
against gays and lesbians-as Coloradans know--other members of the
international community are going in the opposite direction. Indeed,
discrimination against gays and lesbians has been the topic of discussion
at numerous international conferences with measures being taken in the
Economic and Social Committee of the U.N. and within the framework of
18. 140 CONG. REC. 55340 (daily ed. May 2, 1994).
19. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, Paper on the death penalty and juveniles (on file with LA
RAZA LAW JOURNAL).
20. Human Rights Watch Deplores U.S. Unwillingness to Address Shortcomings in U.S. Human
Rights Practices, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Oct. 4, 1995) (press release, on file with the La Raza Law
Journal)
21. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 17.
22. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
23. Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/50/d/488/1992 (1994) (reviewing a communication
under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, held that "it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity
in private is covered by the concept of 'privacy'..."). Two European Court of Human Rights cases are
in accord with Toonen. InNorris v. Ireland 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 186 (1991) and Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1982), the European Court, based on a similar privacyprovision contained in Article 8.1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signatureNov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, decided that adult
homosexual consensual conduct enjoyed privacy protection. These decisions are diametrically opposed
to the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion in Bowers.
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the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council
of Europe to help eliminate discrimination against gays and lesbians in
the areas of health care, education, work, housing, stigmatization of youth,
criminal laws, and freedom of movement, to name a few. To this end, the
European Parliament passed a resolution on equal rights for homosexuals
and lesbians in the European Community.
So clearly, it is not quite accurate to say, as the U.S. did in its report to
the UNHRC, that no new protections come from the ICCPR and thus the
U.S. has no need to pass enabling legislation that would make the treaty
enforceable in domestic courts.24 Perhaps what the U.S. government
means is that it does not want to afford certain of its citizens myriad
protections to which they are entitled under international human rights
norms. And, as this essay proceeds to review certain laws such as the so-
called "Save Our State" California proposition, it is evident that
international human rights laws, such as the ICCPR, grant individuals
access to substantial protections not available under U.S. domestic
jurisprudence.
Various international human rights provisions afford grounds upon
which to challenge the legality of Proposition 187 and its clone
legislation. By agreeing to be bound to the non-discrimination
provisions of ICCPR Article 2, every State party "undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status." 25 Thus, Article 2 alone provides six bases of protection on
equality grounds with four-language, social origin, birth or "other
status"-not being part of the U.S.' Equal Protection safety net. Further,
the ICCPR protects against "arbitrary or unlawful interference with ...
privacy, family, home or correspondence, [and] unlawful attacks on...
honour and reputation;"26 and provides that "[e]very child shall have,
without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society, and the State."27 Moreover, additional provisions protect
24. The U.S. declared the ICCPR to be a non-self-executing treaty, making it necessary for
Congress to pass enabling legislation for the covenant to become domestically enforceable U.S. law.
138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). Of course, some of the provisions may be domestically
enforceable notwithstanding the absence of enabling legislation if the same provisions are contained in
the Universal Declaration which could then be considered customary law.
25. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2. See also Article 26 which provides that "[a]ll persons are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." id. art. 26.
26. Id. art. 17.
27. Id. art. 24.
28. Id. art. 6.1
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the rights to life,28 health,2 9 education, 30 right to receive and impart
information,3' and of association.32
With these international norms in mind, it is instructive to review
Proposition 187. Its purpose is clearly articulated in its findings and
declaration that the people of California have suffered and are suffering
personal injury, damages and economic hardship because of the presence
of "illegal aliens" in the state. It is significant, that there is no empirical
substantiation for the very raison d'etre of the legislative initiative.
Certainly, the choice of language itself is deeply troubling. Contrary
to the sense created by the words-"illegal alien"-used to define the
objects at whom the law is aimed, the legislation is not intended to reach
unlawful, extra-terrestrial beings. Rather, its design is to identify a discrete
group: immigrants, real people, whose nefarious criminality is simply their
entry into the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. without proper
documentation. In fact, these people, who more often than not come to
work to be able to support and provide for their families-an exemplary
showing of family values-fill low-skilled, low-cost jobs that U.S. citizens
will not contemplate accepting.
An initial focus on the concept of equality/non-discrimination, reveals
that the Proposition's very definition of who is eligible to receive the social
benefits addressed by the law-public education, health care, welfare
benefits or social services-is disheartening, if not perverted. Certainly,
two of the three eligibility classifications-those stating that U.S. citizens
and aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents are eligible to receive
the specific benefits addressed-are plainly acceptable. The third
category, however, is troubling. It provides for the grant of benefits to an
alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time without regard to
that alien's status at the time benefits are sought. By focusing on time of
entry rather than when the application for benefits is made, such provision
may be discriminatory. For example, Proposition 187 does not limit
eligibility to receive benefits based upon a person's illegal presence in the
jurisdiction. Rather, the provision simply bases eligibility on a person's
legal entry. In this regard, it is significant to underscore the undisputed
fact that over 50% of the illegal presence of foreigners in this country is
comprised of persons who overstay their visa, i.e., who enter legally but
whose continued presence is illegal, or those who are from visa waiver
states who only need a round trip ticket to enter the jurisdiction, but then
do not return and thus also may be illegally present. Significantly, the
demographics of those who overstay-Western and Eastern Europeans
and other Non-Latina/o Whites-are such that they might not be identified
as "diferente" and thus not given the dubious label "illegal aliens."
To be sure, the ICCPR's non-discrimination framework, and even our
own narrower laws, suggest a grave equal protection problem. If indeed
the concern is for the scarcity of economic resources, should we not be
29. Universal Declaration, supra note 8, arL 25(1).
30. Id. art. 26.
31. ICCPI, supra note 6, art. 19.
32. Id. art. 22.
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concerned about illegal presence as well as entry? In this regard it is
noteworthy that all the enhanced enforcement efforts currently afoot are
aimed at border crossings, as evidenced by border patrol increases,
whereas enforcement efforts to curb the other illegal presence are virtually
non-existent.
There are also myriad human rights problems with the investigatory
techniques set out in Proposition 187. The law mandates untrained
administrative personnel, such as teachers and welfare or hospital intake
clerks, to report persons whom they "suspect" are "illegal aliens" seeking
to obtain the covered services. Human rights issues arise, among other
places, in the information or "data" such administrators must use to
establish their "suspicion": the person's appearance, meaning complexion,
hair color and texture, and manner of dress-thinly veiled substitutes for
national or social origin, color, race and ethnicity-all classifications
protected under the ICCPR. A separate basis for suspicion can be a
person's manner of talking, such as speaking "foreign-accented" or
"broken" English, or speaking Spanish-all matters falling within the
ICCPR's language protection.
Moreover, the refusal to provide primary and secondary education,
even higher education, directly interferes with the right to an education
and violates the right of association and the right to impart and receive
information. In this regard, the persons whose rights are hindered are not
only the children (and parents of the children) being denied access to
schools, but also those children (and parents of those children) who are
allowed to stay in school but whose instruction is going forward without
the presence or participation of those excluded.
Similarly, the denial of medical services effects a denial not only of
the right to health but also of other protected rights. For example, if one
considers maternal and infant health issues, Proposition 187 interferes
with women's right to equality on the basis of sex. The related concerns
of maternal and infant mortality effect a possible denial of the protected
right to life both of the mothers who die while pregnant, in childbirth or
thereafter from complications and of the infants who die in childbirth or
during infancy because of the denial of services.
These examples of the intersection of domestic and international
human rights norms serve to underscore the thesis of this essay: a wealth
of international human rights norms exist that can and will serve to
develop, expand and transform our domestic rights jurisprudence. By
bringing such norms home and using them diligently in our courts, we
can bring their protection a little closer to being a reality. At the very
least we can engage in discourse that will facilitate our bridge-building to
a better place in the new century.
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